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RESOLVING DISSENSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Family farms are at the heart of American agricultural production.
They account for ninety-five percent of all farms in the United States
and about sixty percent of the nation's farm products.1 Family farms,
often homesteaded, acquired, or developed by parents, grandparents,
or great-grandparents, are a long standing and important tradition in
rural America. Many Americans trace their heritage to the family
farm.
As the family farm is passed from generation to generation,
through parents and children or brothers and sisters, family members
tend to develop divergent goals regarding the farm's operation. Sadly,
when divergent goals are not properly managed, family farms are par-
alyzed by dissension and deadlock.2 To resolve dissension, family
farm business owners frequently seek judicial redress.3 Courts have
not consistently resolved dissension among family farm owners and
have not adopted clear principles to guide future judicial resolution of
such dissension.4 This Article proposes principles to guide judicial
resolution of cases involving family farm disputes.
To establish a foundation for the proposed principles, this Article
will first discuss the importance of the family farm and the forms of
business organizations family farmers traditionally use.5 The Article
next discusses the causes of dissension among the owners of the fam-
ily farm.6 After examining legislative and judicial approaches to
resolving dissension on the family farm, 7 the Article concludes by pro-
posing standards for resolving disputes plaguing many family farms.8
1. MICHAEL P. BOEHJE & VERNON R. EmAN, FARM MANAGEMENT 4 (1983).
2. The problem of rivalry between family members is not unique to family-owned
farm businesses. See 1 F. HODGE O'NEA & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OP-
PRESSION OF MINORTY SHAREHOLDERS § 2.02, at 2-3 (2d ed. Supp. 1993).
3. See infra notes 88-146 and accompanying text. The growth in number of share-
holder dissension cases decided on oppression grounds has been called "phenome-
nal." See Harry Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits
as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 25, 87
(1987)(citing 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAI's OPPRESSION
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS at iii (2d ed. 1985). See also J.A.C. Hetherington,
Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 9 (1987), ("Conflicts between the interests of controlling
and minority shareholders in stock corporations have been and continue to be
major-perhaps the single most important problem-in corporation law.").
4. See infra text accompanying notes 88-146.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 9-33.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 34-87.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 88-152.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 153-200.
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II. ATTRIBUTES OF FAMILY-OWNED FARMS
Family-owned farms share many attributes of other typical family-
owned and operated businesses. In some ways, however, family farms
are part of a unique culture, making dispute resolution even more dif-
ficult. Family-owned farms are special in many ways. Many immi-
grants to the United States, as well as Native Americans, trace their
roots to small farms. Today's family farmers, and the descendants of
family farmers, have a deep emotional tie to farm country. Family
farmers, thought to be independent, hardworking, and self-reliant,
epitomize many American ideals. The family farmers' historic com-
mitment to long term stewardship of the land is increasingly valued
by today's more environmentally-conscious society. Public policy, in
many instances, attempts to preserve these attributes of the family
farm.
A. Public Policy Favoring Preservation of Family Farms
Congress has demonstrated on many occasions its desire to grant
family farms special treatment.9 For example, Congress has provided
special estate tax provisions designed in part to encourage continua-
tion of family farms. Section 2032A of the Internal Revenue Code en-
courages family farming by allowing special lower estate tax
valuations of land for ongoing farm businesses.1 0 In addition, federal
9. Professor J.W. Looney appropriately observes: "Congress has, from time to time,
recognized family farming as important to the economic well-being of agriculture
and has specified that new programs funded by USDA must give appropriate at-
tention to the effects they may have on the structure of family orientated agricul-
ture." J.W. Looney, The Changing Focus of Government Regulation of
Agriculture in the United States 44 MERCER L. REv. 763, 792 (1993). Carol Ann
Eiden presents a more cynical view of Congress' efforts to help the family farm.
Carol Ann Eiden, The Courts' Role in Preserving the Family Farm During Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings Involving FmHA Loans, 11 LAw & INEQ. J. 417,424-29 (1993).
10. I.R.C. § 2032A (Supp. IV 1992). Although the special-use valuation provisions of
§ 2032A apply to all closely held businesses, the applicable legislative history de-
scribes its importance for preservation of farms. The legislative history describes
the incentives it creates for continued use of farm property as farm property:
Your committee believes that, when land is actually used for farming
purposes or in other closely held businesses (both before and after the
decedent's death), it is inappropriate to value the land on the basis of its
potential "highest and best use" especially since it is desirable to en-
courage the continued use of-property for farming and other small busi-
ness purposes. Valuation on the basis of highest and best use, rather
than actual use, may result in the imposition of substantially higher es-
tate taxes. In some cases, the greater estate tax burden makes continua-
tion of farming, or the closely held business activities, not feasible
because the income potential from these activities is insufficient to ser-
vice extended tax payments or loans obtained to pay the tax. Thus, the
heirs may be forced to sell the land for development purposes. ...
However, your committee recognizes that it would be a windfall to
the beneficiaries of an estate to allow real property used for farming or
[Vol. 73:14
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bankruptcy law provides special debt relief for family farmers suffer-
ing financial distress."' Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code makes it
easier for family farm businesses to survive bankruptcy intact.12 Fi-
nally, Congress designed many of the federal farm programs with an
eye toward providing special benefits to the family farmer.13 Farmers
Home Administration Farm Ownership Loans are designed to assist
family farm operations.14 Because of the $50,000 payment limitation
with respect to many federal farm programs, small farm operators re-
ceive proportionally more federal farm benefits than large corporate
farms.15
To ensure the survival of family farms, over a dozen states have
enacted legislation prohibiting corporate ownership of farm land in-
tending to favor families as farm owners.16 Anti-corporate farm legis-
lation preserves family farms by limiting the ability of non-family
corporations to buy land and by making it easier for families to buy
farms at lower costs. These statutes also reduce the incentive for fam-
ily farmers to sell out because of higher land prices.
Though public policy clearly favors preservation of the family farm,
the reasons behind the public policy are less certain. Because farmers
constitute only two percent of the United States population, family
farmers do not wield tremendous political power.17 Nonetheless, pres-
ervation of the family farm has been justified on several policy
grounds. Some support for continued preservation of the family farm
results from the family farmers' own interests in reducing competition
from large corporate farmers. Other reasons, however, extend past
the agricultural community's self interest. Some have persuasively
argued that family ownership of agricultural land helps preserve ru-
ral, social, and economic structures' 8 and promotes responsible stew-
closely held business purposes to be valued for estate tax purposes at its
farm or business value unless the beneficiaries continue to use the prop-
erty for farm or business purposes, at least for a reasonable period of
time after the decedent's death.
H.R. Rep. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3375-76.
11. See 11 U.S.CA §§ 1201-1231 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1994).
12. See, e.g., Barbara Dockery Tremper, The Montana Family Farmer Under Chapter
12 Bankruptcy, 49 MoNT. L. REv. 40 (1988).
13. See Looney, supra note 9, at 792-93.
14. See 7 C.F.R. § 1943.2 (1993).
15. See 7 U.S.C. § 1308 (1988).
16. See JULAx C. JUERGENMEYER & JAMEs BRYCE WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW
§ 30.12, 154-55 (1982).
17. J.W. LooNEY ET AL., AGRICULTURAL LAW: A LAWvER's GumE TO REPRESENTING
FARM CLmErs 6 (1990).
18. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged the legitimacy of these policies in MSM Farms,
Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1991). According to this case, Ne-
braska's anti-corporate farming statute prevents "a perceived threat that would
stem from unrestricted corporate ownership of Nebraska farm land by preventing
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ardship of soil, water, and other resources.1 9 Family owners of
agricultural land also help ensure efficiency. Further, when small
farms predominate, no one producer is able to influence prices.20
Since production of food and fiber is so important, the public clearly
has an interest in preserving vigorous competition in the farm
economy.2 '
B. Structure of the Family Farm
Family members structure family farms in different ways.2 2 Many
family farms are operated without creating a separate legal entity,
such as a partnership or corporation, to manage the operation. Often
parents own farm real estate while the children serve as employees or
tenants. In other cases, each member of the family owns or leases
separate parcels of farm real estate but cooperates, often informally,
in the management of them. Family members may, for example,
share machinery or contribute labor to each other during planting and
harvesting. In these informal operations, when individual family
members develop differing goals, the joint operation is quite easily
dissolved.
Unfortunately for families experiencing dissension, many farms
are organized as corporations and partnerships which constitute sepa-
rate legal entities. Family farms organized as separate legal entities
are more difficult to dissolve. According to the 1987 Census of Agri-
culture, 9.7% of U.S. farms are organized as partnerships, while 3.2%
are organized as corporations.2 3 Because successful family farms
need increasing amounts of capital and management sophistication,
the concentration of farmland in the hands of non-family corporations." Id. See
also MARTY STRANGE, FAMILY FARMING: A NEW ECONOMIC VISION 128-31
(1988)(cited in Looney, supra note 9, at 793)(discussing the manipulation of fam-
ily farm legislation and how corporations have influenced Congress in this area
since the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902); Steven Babls & Jane Easter
Bahls, Just How Bad Is Corporate Farming?, FARM FUTURES, Dec. 1991, at 7.
19. Carol Ann Eiden has observed that "[flamily farmers practice better soil conser-
vation methods than nonfamily industrial farms." Eiden, supra note 9, at 423.
Eiden argues that "[i]ndustrial farms lack the personal link to the land that in-
spires both valuable stewardship and better food." Eiden, supra note 9, at 423.
20. See 1 NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAw vi (1983).
21. J.W. Looney has observed:
Farmers are also viewed as a uniquely stabilizing element in society be-
cause of their vital role in food and fiber production. Modem society con-
tinues to perceive small farms, and especially those identified as 'family
farms,' as particularly desirable. These types of farms seem to epitomize
and promote the American value of self-sufficiency.
LOONEY ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.
22. See BOEHJE & EIDMAN, supra note 1, at 356-90.
23. 1987 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, GEOGRAPHIC SERIES VOL. 1.
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the trend toward corporate or partnership farms is likely to
continue. 24
Family farms desiring to operate as separate legal entities, how-
ever, are no longer limited to operation as corporations or partner-
ships.25 In many states, small businesses are now permitted to
operate as limited liability companies. 2 6 Limited liability companies
are hybrid business entities which combine the favorable attributes of
corporations and partnerships. The owners of limited liability compa-
nies obtain the corporate attribute of limited liability and enjoy part-
nership "pass-through" tax advantages. 27 Because of these benefits,
many believe that limited liability companies may supplant partner-
ships as the organization of choice for small businesses. 28 Because
owners of family farms need to be concerned about both limited liabil-
ity and "pass-through" tax benefits, limited liability companies will
likely be attractive alternatives to family farmers.2 9
Forming a separate business entity for a family farm, however, has
disadvantages. Operating in the form of a partnership, corporation, or
24. See BoEHmE & EmrNAN, supra note 1, at 357.
25. For an excellent discussion of the factors important to select a business entity,
see J.W. Looney & Lonnie R. Beard, Farm Business Planning: Coordinating
Farm Program Payments with Tax Law, 57 UMKC L. Ray. 157 (1989).
26. As of the summer of 1993, approximately 30 states authorized limited liability
companies. Shop Talk: Tax Trap for Professionals Forming LLCs, 79 J. TA-XN 63
(1993). The author expects nearly all states to authorize limited liability compa-
nies by 1995. For excellent general discussions of limited liability companies, see
Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41
CAsE W. Rus. L. REv. 387 (1991); Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited
Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REv. 44
(1992); Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic
Comparative Primer (Part Two), 37 S.D. L. Rav. 467 (1992); Susan Pace Hamill,
The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Business, 41 FLA. L.
REv. 721 (1989); Robert R. Keatinge, et al., The Limited Liability Company: A
Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 375 (1992).
Several state statutes prohibit limited liability companies from owning or
leasing agricultural land. For example, the Kansas anti-corporate farming stat-
ute broadly limits the limited liability companies to engage in farming:
No corporation, trust, limited liability company, limited partnership or
corporate partnership, other than a family farm corporation, authorized
farm corporation, limited liability agricultural company, limited agricul-
tural partnership, family trust, authorized trust or testamentary trust
shall, either directly or indirectly, own, acquire or otherwise obtain or
lease any agricultural land in this state.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5904(a)(Supp. 1992). See also IowA CODE § 9H.3A (Supp.
1994); MmN. STAT. § 500.24 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 47-9A-1
(Supp. 1993). These statutes are designed to preserve the integrity of statutes
that restrict corporate farming.
27. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
28. See sources cited supra note 26.
29. See Steven C. Bahls & Jane Easter Bahls, A Promising Solution to the Business-
Structure Riddle, F~Mu FuTuREs, OctJNov. 1992, at 22.
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limited liability company may cause thorny problems when the own-
ers develop divergent goals. If divergent goals are not properly man-
aged, courts may take steps to resolve the dissension. Under
partnership law, for example, courts may intervene in partnership af-
fairs when a partner engages in "wrongful conduct that adversely and
materially effects the partnership business"30 or when a partner en-
gages in conduct making it "not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in partnership with the partner."3 1 Similarly, corporate law
authorizes judicial intervention when managers of the corporation are
deadlocked or when "directors or those in control of the corporation
have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive, or fraudulent."3 2 Finally, the law governing limited liability
companies typically provides that courts may intervene in the affairs
of a limited liability company when members make it "not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business" of the limited liability com-
pany.33 Before courts can properly use these powers to fashion reme-
dies resolving dissension among the family farm owners, courts should
understand the origin of dissension among family farm owners.
III. THE PROBLEM OF DISSENSION AMONG OWNERS OF
FAMILY FARMS
A. Causes of Dissension
The problem of dissension among the owners of family-owned
farms is significant. As farm ownership devolves from generation to
generation, some heirs may want to aggressively expand the farm
while others may wish to operate more conservatively. In addition,
those active in the farm likely desire adequate compensation and may
want to reinvest most of the earnings in the enterprise. Children mov-
ing off the farm, however, often seek current income from the farm to
supplement their non-farm income. At some point, these children may
want to liquidate their interest in the farm and invest elsewhere hop-
ing for a greater return. If off-the-farm heirs wish to be bought out,
heirs working the farm often cannot generate enough cash to accom-
plish the purchase. These divergent goals too frequently lead to dis-
sension.34 Dissension typically boils over when the senior family
members (mother and father), who served as the glue holding the fam-
ily together, die.
Although dissension among siblings is common, it may also result
from transitions of ownership between parent and child. Many times
30. UNIF. PARTNmE~sHi ACT § 601(5)(i)(1992).
31. Id. § 601(5)(iii).
32. MODEL BusaNEss CORP. AcT. § 14.30(2)(ii) (1984).
33. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAR. Co. AcT § 902 (1992).
34. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 2.04.
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the retiring parents, often somewhat more cautious by nature than
their children, hesitate before giving control of the farm to the chil-
dren, who may be approaching middle age. 35 Parent and child may
have different philosophies about chemical use, participation in fed-
eral farm programs, conservation practices, and crop or animal selec-
tion. Parents and children may also disagree over who is entitled to
farm profits. The parents may desire to draw substantial income from
the operation even though they devote increasingly less time to the
farm. The children, on the other hand, may wish to exert more control
and draw more income from the farm for their own families. Cash
flow generated from the farm may not be sufficient to support the
desires of both parent and child. Because farming is capital-intensive,
without significant additional capital investment, it is often not possi-
ble to increase the farm's cash flow enough to support two families. As
a result, this blending of the first generation life cycle with the second
generation life cycle sometimes causes dissension between family
members.3 6
Family disagreements often result in ineffective use of manage-
ment time, resource-draining litigation, and inability to obtain needed
financing.37 In addition to causing financial loss, valuable family rela-
tionships can be damaged beyond repair. Otherwise cordial and
healthy relations may turn vindictive and destructive.
Closely-held businesses do not usually provide, in advance, for
proper dispute resolution.3 8 Professor Charles R. O'Kelley notes:
"Viewed contractually, the typical closely held corporation is mostly
35. For a discussion of the parent who "hangs on," see O'NEFL & THOMPSON, supra
note 2, § 2.05.
36. For an excellent discussion of the problems faced by the merging of these life
cycles, see BoEJHE & EmMAN, supra note 1, at 357-59.
37. For a discussion of the financial and hardship resulting from dissension on the
farm, see Jane Easter Bahls, Farm Partnership Disputes, FARM FuruREs, Mar.
1987, at 29-30. For a discussion of the losses to the economy as a result of share-
holder dissension, see 1 ONEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 1.04.
38. Though most family-owned businesses do not provide systems to resolve disputes
between owners, systems do exist to resolve disputes. Arbitration can be an effec-
tive way of dispute resolution for owners of close corporations. See 1 O'NasAL &
THozNPSON, supra note 2, § 5.25. Likewise, shareholders might enter into an
agreement whereby one shareholder buys the interest of another in the event of
deadlock. ONeal & Thompson, supra note 2, § 5.26.
Other possible dispute resolution mechanisms include mediation. Mediation
has been used with increasing success over the last few years by farmers and
ranchers. See Steven C. Bahls & Jane Easter Bahls, Resolving Disputes Outside
the Courtroom, FAmu FUTUREs, Nov. 1992, at 14H. Mediated solutions to dis-
putes between family members are superior to court-imposed or arbitrator-im-
posed solutions because the parties must agree to a mediated solution. Solutions
agreed to by the parties are likely to have a more lasting impact.
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gaps." 3 9 He notes that owners of closely held firms usually fail to
agree, ex ante, how the "closely held firm and its investors will sub-
stantively adapt to most future contingencies."40 Likewise, family-
owned farms fail to see how to address future business contingencies
and how to respond to changes in shareholders' expectations. This is
partly because business in rural America is often done with a hand-
shake.41 Instead of seeing lawyers to discuss contingencies and obtain
a well-crafted agreement governing family farm operation, families
rely on trust and goodwill.42 In a 1992 survey conducted by the Agri-
cultural Law Committee of the American Bar Association's General
Practice Section, attorneys representing farmers reported that busi-
ness agreements controlling farm governance were woefully inade-
quate.43 The ABA survey found that only thirty-four percent of
farmers participating in farm partnerships have "adequate" partner-
ship agreements. 44 Fewer than half (forty-four percent) of farm corpo-
rations have "adequate" bylaws, corporate minutes and shareholders'
(buy-sell) agreements. 45 Only thirty-two percent of the farmers, ac-
cording to those surveyed, had adequate estate plans.4 6 Estate plans,
of course, are essential in providing for ownership succession that
minimize dissent.
The lack of bargaining about future contingencies is not surprising.
Family members trust each other. It is often easier to focus on future
39. Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Trans-
action Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 216, 216 (1993).
40. Id. See also Steven C. Bahls, Ag Law Committee Survey: Benefit From More
Legal Advice, 2 A.B.A. GEN. PRAC. SEC. AG. COmMITTEE UPDATE: AGRICULTURAL
LAw 3 (1993).
41. According to Allen and Lueck, the reason for the substantial informality in farm
business contracts is that markets help self-enforce farm contracts:
It is well known that markets can "self-enforce" contracts. Punishment
to cheaters, through lost future trade, encourages cooperation between
the contract parties (Kreps). This reputation enforcement is most effec-
tive where information about cheating is good and a frequent and long-
lived relationship is desired. For Midwestern farmland contracts these
conditions are met. Farmers are a part of a small "community" of people
who have known each other most of their lives. People would be quickly
aware of anyone who cheated another and would avoid future dealings
with that person.
Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, The "Back Forty" on a Handshake: Specific As-
sets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.
366, 369-70 (1992).
42. Rather than consulting lawyers for preventative purposes during the decision
making process, farmers often consult with lawyers only after a transaction has
unravelled. See Drew L. Kershen, Introduction, 21 S.D. L. REv. 479, 483 (1976).
Further, "farmers, unlike most businessmen' do not have automatic access to
legal advice. JUERGENSMEYER & WADLEY, supra note 16, § 1.2, at 8.
43. Bahls, supra note 40.
44. Bahls, supra note 40.
45. Bahls, supra note 40.
46. Bahls, supra note 40.
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profits than future problems. When gaps exist in the contract gov-
erning the family farm relationship, the majority owners, by default,
are the primary gap-filling authorities. If minority shareholders
mount a serious dissent through a lawsuit, courts become the secon-
dary gap fillers.47 Case law, however, has not been consistent in its
approach to resolving dissension on the farm.48 Courts should provide
clearer guidance to owners of family farms suffering from dissension.
B. Difficulty in Resolving Dissension in Family Farm
Businesses
When minority shareholders become unhappy with the majority,
they have very few options. If the farm is incorporated and share-
holder dissension arises, the majority will probably freeze out minor-
ity shareholders. Common techniques majority shareholders utilize to
freeze out minority shareholders include restricting the shareholders'
rights to participate in management, and denying access to informa-
tion and rights to receive salaries, dividends, or other distributions.49
With publicly-owned corporations, unhappy owners can sell their
stock, thereby realizing some value for their interest. In addition, the
market provides a powerful incentive for management in publicly-
owned corporations to maximize profits, thereby maximizing owners'
returns.50 If management is incompetent or profits are lackluster,
shareholders will sell their shares, depressing stock prices. This in
turn makes it more likely that a new owner (often a corporate raider)
will acquire control of the corporation. The new owner will likely re-
place incompetent management so that the company will operate
more efficiently. Consequently, incumbent management in a publicly-
owned corporation has an incentive to manage efficiently or face being
replaced.45
The market mechanism which encourages efficiency, however, does
not operate well with family-owned farm corporations. Corporate
raiders are not interested in closely held farm businesses. Realisti-
cally, the only potential buyers of these businesses are the other fam-
ily members. Unfortunately, family members frequently have neither
the ability nor the desire to purchase the shares owned by disgruntled
family members. As an initial matter, farm businesses generally have
47. See O'Kelley, supra note 39, at 216.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 88-146. For a general discussion of the courts'
failure to provide for clear guidance in corporate dissension cases, see Steven C.
Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable
Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 315-18 (1990).
49. See generally 1 O'NEAL & THOMPsON, supra note 2, §§ 3.02-3.07 (discussing vari-
ous squeeze-out techniques).
50. See generally RICHARD POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.6, (3d ed. 1986).
51. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1174-80 (1981).
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a low ratio of liquid to fixed assets.52 Most farms, in other words, are
land rich but cash poor. As a result, unless they sell all or part of the
family farm, the majority shareholders usually cannot generate suffi-
cient cash to purchase the remaining family members' interests.5 3
Furthermore, even if the majority owners could generate enough cash,
they have little incentive to do so. Since majority owners already con-
trol management, they gain little by purchasing a minority share-
holder's interest. Majority owners in this position will therefore offer
a purchase price of no more than the discounted value of the future
stream of payments to which the minority shareholder is otherwise
entitled, adjusted by the transaction costs of dealing with the share-
holder on an ongoing basis.5 4 To the extent dividends and other dis-
tributions are not often made by family farms, majority shareholders
have little incentive to pay full fair market value for the disgruntled
family member's interest.
To increase a minority shareholder's difficulty, two legal doctrines
serve to prevent the minority shareholder from removing inefficient or
ineffective management and from combatting squeeze-outs in the fam-
ily farm. The first of these legal doctrines is the Majority Rule Doc-
trine.5 5 While decisions in families are best made by consensus, the
Majority Rule Doctrine allows the majority to operate a family farm
operation without involving the minority owners in a meaningful
way.5 6 As a result, in order to dispute a business judgment the dis-
gruntled family member must rely on breach of duty. The second doc-
trine, the Business Judgment Rule, creates another obstacle for
minority shareholders. The Rule creates a presumption that manage-
ment (directors and officers) have fulfilled their duties if they "ration-
ally believe that [their] business judgment is in the best interest of the
corporation."5 7 This Rule makes courts unwilling to second guess ma-
jority decisions absent a showing that the majority owners are acting
52. See 5 NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAw § 41.01(2), at 41-9 (1982).
53. See 1 DONALD H. KELLY & DAVID A. LUDTKE, ESTATE PLANNING FOR FARMERs AND
RANCHERS, § 1.14, at 1-12 (2d ed. Supp. 1990).
54. See generally Bahls, supra note 48, at 292-93.
55. See generally Linda J. Shapiro, Comment, Involuntary Disassociation of Close
Corporations for Mistreatment of Minority Shareholders 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1119,
1149 (1982)(observing that the Majority Rule Doctrine conflicts with the minority
interests in a close corporation where most shareholders expect to participate in
management).
56. Several courts have found that when shareholders in corporations acquire stock,
they tacitly agree to be bound by the Majority Rule Doctrine. Wheeler v. Pullman
Iron & Steel Co., 32 N.E. 420,423 (Ill. 1892); Polikoffv. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp.,
184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962).
57. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECONMENDATIONS § 4.01
cmt. (c), at 227 (A.L.I. Proposed Final Draft 1992). This rule also requires that
management be not financially interested in the transaction and reasonably in-
formed with respect to the transaction in question. Id.
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in bad faith and thus creates difficult problems of proof for disgruntled
family members seeking to vindicate their rights as owners.
As a result of these problems, courts have increasingly found a
duty in closely held businesses to avoid oppression of disgruntled mi-
nority interest holders.5S If this duty is violated, courts are permitted
by both common law and statute to apply a broad range of equitable
remedies. 59 To determine whether controlling owners have violated
the duty to avoid oppression, courts and commentators often look at
whether the controlling owners violated the reasonable expectations
of the minority owners. 60 In the family farm context, as in other fam-
ily business contexts, reasonable expectations might include: (1) the
expectation of distributions of earnings, if the profits and cash flow of
the business allow;61 (2) the expectation that owners will share the
fruits of the business on a pro rata basis;62 (3) the expectation of a
significant and meaningful voice in management;63 and (4) the expec-
58. See Bahls, supra note 48, at 294-312.
59. See Bahls, supra note 48, at 294-312.
60. See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Maschmeier v. Southside
Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); Sawyer v. Curt & Co., 1991
Minn. App. LEXIS 117 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1991); Pedro v. Pedro, 463
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929 (Mont.
1982); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979), affd, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), cert. denied,
425 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1980); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232
(N.M. Ct. App. 1986); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984);
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411
N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Gee v. Blue Stone Hunting Club, Inc., 604 A.2d 1141
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1980); 2
F. HODGE O'NTL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.30 (3d. ed.
1993); Donald F. Clifford Jr., Close Corporation Shareholder Reasonable Expecta-
tions: The Larger Context, 22 WAKE FOREST L. Ray. 41 (1987); Robert W. Hill-
man, Indissoluble Partnerships, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 691 (1985); Sandra K. Miller,
Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude a
Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose, 97 DicK. L. REv. 227
(1993); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reason-
able Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988).
61. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatty, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (N.Y. 1984).
62. See, e.g., Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co. 645 P.2d 929, 936 (Mont. 1982)(finding reason-
able expectation of sharing benefits of inherited ranch).
63. See, e.g. Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 936 (Mont. 1982); Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., Inc. 629 P.2d 214,221 (Mont. 1981); McCauley v. Tom McCauley &
Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232,238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473
N.E.2d 1173, 1179, (N.Y. 1984); In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center, Co.,
487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). In the family farm context, the parents do not always wish
to give absentee children the absolute right to participate in management. Kelly
& Ludtke note:
Generally, they wish to give the absentee children an interest in the
farm, while limiting the powers associated with such an interest in order
to avoid interference with the operator. But, fairness also requires some
1994]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tation that the majority will not profit unfairly from the business at
the expense of minority shareholders. 6 4
Not all violations of expectations, however, amount to actionable
oppression. An off-farm family member's hope for increasing distribu-
tions year after year is unlikely to amount to a reasonable expectation
in light of the unpredictable nature of farm cash flows. As a general
rule, courts have determined that expectations are reasonable and de-
serving of protection only if the expectations were known and accepted
at the time the owner acquired his or her interest.6 5 Even then, before
protecting the expectation, courts must determine that the expecta-
tion was central to participation in the enterprise.
If majority owners violate their duty to avoid oppression, courts
apply equitable remedies. These remedies include dissolving the busi-
ness, 66 ordering that the business (or its owners) purchase the inter-
est of the complaining minority owners, 67 partitioning the business
property, 68 and requiring payment of a dividend or other distribu-
tion 69 or appointment of a receiver, fiscal agent, or provisional direc-
assurances that the farm operators will not use the management posi-
tion to the disadvantage of the absentee owners.
1 KELLY & LuDTrE, supra note 53, § 12.02, at 12-4.
64. See, e.g., Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 236 (Mont. 1983).
65. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, (N.Y.
1984)("[O]ppression should be deemed to arise only when the majority conduct
substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable
under the circumstances and were central to ... join[ing] the venture."); Meisel-
man v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983)("'[r]easonable expectations'
are to be ascertained by examining the entire history of the participants' relation-
ship"); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 649, 655 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985)("[F]or a plaintiffs expectations to be reasonable, they must be known or
assumed by the other shareholders and concurred in by them.").
66. See, e.g., MODEL BusINEss CoRP. AcT § 14.30 (1984); Uzi'U. PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 601(5)(1992); ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LAR. Co. ACT § 902 (1992).
67. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274-75 (Alaska
1980)(stating that trial courts have the inherent equitable power to provide alter-
nate remedies); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984)(stat-
ing that the state statute granting the district court power to liquidate a
corporation allows the district court to fashion other equitable relief); Fix v. Fix
Material Co., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)(stating that the court
is not limited to the statutory remedy of dissolution, but may consider other ap-
propriate alternative equitable relief); Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 237
(Mont. 1983)(stating that a court sitting in equity is empowered to fashion an
equitable result); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 393
(Or. 1973)(stating that courts are not limited to the remedy of dissolution but
may, as an alternative, consider other specified appropriate relief).
68. See Kay v. Key West Dev. Co., 72 So. 2d 786, 788 (Fla. 1954); McCauley v. Tom
McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 236 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
69. See Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So. 2d 58, 62 (Miss. 1982)(reversing lower court's hold-
ing "that there be no payments of dividends without unanimous consent of the
board of directors"); Muller v. Silverstein, 92 A.D.2d 455, 456 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983); Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848, 857 (Tex. 1955). See also Dodge v.
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tor.70 Courts have also used their equitable powers to remove
owners, 71 order forfeiture of unlawful distributions, 72 set aside a ma-
jority owner's action,73 and order an accounting.74
Resolving dissension in family farm partnerships and family farm
limited liability companies is somewhat simpler than in comparable
corporations. Because both partnerships 75 and limited liability com-
panies 76 lack continuity of life, owners may withdraw from participa-
tion at any time. A limited liability company member may withdraw
and force a dissolution even if the withdrawal violates the operating
agreement governing the limited liability company.77 The member
causing the wrongful withdrawal, of course, is liable to the limited lia-
bility company for the damages the wrongful withdrawal may have
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681-82 (Mich. 1919)(stating that directors should
not arbitrarily withhold the profits earned by the company and must exercise
discretion for the profit of the shareholder); Erdman v. Yolles, 233 N.W.2d 667,
669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)(stating that the lower court properly found that the
distribution of profits was a dividend); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692,
695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947)(allowing the judgment of the controlling directors if
made in good faith). Cf. Chounis v. Laing, 23 S.E.2d 628, 640 (W. Va. 1942)(or-
dering the corporation to pay plaintiff a share of profit "whether represented by
dividends, salaries, retained assets or otherwise ... ").
70. See, e.g., Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315, 322 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Burleson v.
Hayutin, 273 P.2d 124, 128 (Colo. 1954); Drob v. National Memorial Park, Inc., 41
A.2d 589, 597 (Del. Ch. 1945); Handlan v. Handian, 232 S.W.2d 944, 950 (Mo.
1950); Thisted v. Tower Mgmt. Corp., 409 P.2d 813, 821 (Mont. 1966); Imbriale v.
Imbriale, 144 A.D.2d 557, 559, (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
71. See, e.g., Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963)("[Slince directors hold a position of trust, judicial power to remove
them exists independent of statute.").
72. See, e.g., Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283, 291 (I11. App. Ct. 1985);
ABC Trans Nat'l Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 413 N.E.2d
1299, 1314-15 (IlM. App. Ct. 1980).
73. See, e.g., Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315, 324 (W.D. Pa. 1982)(enjoining
executive committee from circumventing the delegated responsibilities of the di-
rectors); Katcher v. Ohsman, 97 A.2d 180, 186 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953)(en-
joining holding of special meeting of directors to oust minority shareholder
officers and to grant salaries to majority shareholders to the exclusion of minority
shareholder); Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp., 434 P.2d 339, 343 (Or.
1967)(stating that the court had the power "to cancel the stock increase and re-
store the stockholders to their former proportionate status"); Bank of Mill Creek
v. Elk Horn Coal Co., 57 S.E.2d 736, 748 (W. Va. 1950)(setting aside sale of corpo-
rate assets because of an inadequate price); Lierney v. United Pocahontas Coal
Co., 102 S.E. 249, 255 (W. Va. 1920)(setting aside sale of corporate assets because
of an inadequate price).
74. See, e.g., Gray v. Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506, 509 (IM. App. Ct. 1973)(stating that plain-
tiff is entitled to an accounting of a corporation's books); Segall v. Shore, 215
S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1975)(ordering an accounting of the business conducted by
the partnership and corporation).
75. UN m. PARTNRasmp AcT § 601 (1992).




caused.7 8 In the case of the family farm, these damages might be sig-
nificant if the wrongful dissolution causes premature liquidation of
the farm. Upon a member's withdrawal, the remaining members may
unanimously agree to continue the business, and the withdrawing
member is then entitled to receive, within a reasonable time, the fair
value of his or her interest. 79 If the other members do not continue
the business, the business is liquidated.80 After creditors are paid, all
members are entitled to a return of their contributions and their share
of remaining earnings.8 1 Partners have similar, though not identical,
rights pursuant to the Uniform Partnership Act.82
In light of the statutory scheme governing partnerships and lim-
ited liability companies, it would initially seem that judicial interven-
tion in disputes between owners of farm partnerships and limited
liability companies is unnecessary. Disgruntled owners may simply
withdraw, causing dissolution and triggering the right to some form of
distribution. When courts intervene in disputes between corporate
owners, the most common remedy is a court-ordered purchase of the
complaining owner's interest.8 3 In effect, partnership statutes and
limited liability company statutes provide the same remedy to owners
of those entities that are provided to owners of closely held businesses
without the necessity of going to court.
Nevertheless, courts might still become involved in limited liability
company and partnership oppression cases. A court might become in-
volved, for example, when the limited liability company or partnership
documents provide for a lengthy term of existence. In such a case, if a
partner or limited liability company member causes a premature dis-
solution, any distribution owing to that person upon their dissociation
will be reduced by the amount of damages the premature dissolution
causes the business.84 As an illustration, consider the following hypo-
thetical involving a three-person limited liability company operating a
family farm. Assume that Farmer Jones left his farm equally to his
three children, Bob, Betty, and Bert. Further assume that Bob and
Betty operate the farm, while Bert pursues a graduate school educa-
tion. Assume also that the document chartering the limited liability
company provides for a twenty-five-year term of existence. If Bob and
78. Id. § 802(C).
79. Id. § 902(C).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 905.
82. See UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 601-603 (1992).
83. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Pro-
posed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problems, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1, 30-31 (1977)(observing that courts ordered a buyout in 26 of 54 reported
corporate cases in a two-year period).




Betty, the on-farm heirs, form an alliance, they may resent Bert's per-
sistent request for some return from the farm. They may react by
squeezing Bert out from participation in the management and finan-
cial rewards of the farm. Bob and Betty's wrongful conduct might
leave Bert no alternative but to withdraw from the farm. The gov-
erning statute is likely to provide that Bert's withdrawal before the
end of the twenty-five-year term is wrongful, causing him to suffer a
reduction in the amount due to him equal to the amount of damages
caused by his premature withdrawal.85 As a result of their wrongful
action, therefore, Bob and Betty have gained full control of the farm
business and paid Bert a discounted amount.
A better course of action for Bob to take would require him to ask a
court to use its equitable power to order a remedy more capable of
resolving the dispute fairly. Courts of equity have historically exer-
cised broad power over disputes between owners of corporations8 6 and
partnerships.8 7 Presumably, just as courts have used their equitable
powers to resolve disputes among owners of corporations and partner-
ships, they may use them to resolve disputes among owners of limited
liability companies.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO
RESOLVING DISSENSION AMONG OWNERS
OF THE FAMILY FARM
In recent years, courts have decided a significant number of cases
involving disputes between owners of family farms. Because of the
unique attributes of the family-owned farm and the public policy
favoring continuation of family farms, courts have often hesitated to
dissolve them, especially farms operated as corporations. Moreover,
courts have not been consistent in their approaches to resolving dis-
putes on the family farm. The difficulty courts have in addressing dis-
85. See, e.g., UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 602 (1992); ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LiAR. Co.
ACT § 802(C) (1992).
86. See Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817,825 (4th
Cir. 1933); Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 746, 751
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893)("[N]ew remedies and unprecedented orders are not unwel-
come aids to the chancellor to meet the constantly varying demands for equitable
relief.").
87. See, e.g., Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Wood v. Holiday Mobile Home Resorts, Inc., 625
P.2d 337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); Owen v. Cohen,
119 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1941); Lau v. Wong, 616 P.2d 1031 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980); Tem-
brina v. Simos, 567 N.E.2d 536 (IlM. App. Ct. 1991); Susman v. Venture, 449
N.E.2d 143 (IlM. App. Ct. 1983); Ferrick v. Barry, 68 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (Mass.
1946)("Even if the court may think that one partner could carry on successfully, if
he were allowed to push aside the others, it ought not to sanction such an altera-
tion in the agreed relations of the partners."); Ohlendorfv. Feinstein, 636 S.W.2d
687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Boland v. Daly, 318 A.2d 329 (Pa. 1974).
19941
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
putes between owners of family-held farms is vividly illustrated by a
review of recent leading family farm dissension cases.88
A. The Montana Trilogy of Cases
The Montana Supreme Court has decided more dissension cases
involving family farms than the courts of any other state. Over the
course of three years, the Montana Supreme Court decided three cases
involving dissension among family farm owners. The Montana cases,
Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc.,8 9 Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, Inc.,90 and Mad-
dox v. Norman,9 1 illustrate courts' willingness to measure family farm
corporations by different standards than other types of corporations.
In the Skierka case, Jeanne Skierka sued a family farm corpora-
tion and her brother-in-law, John, who controlled the operation of the
corporation. Jeanne alleged that John's conduct amounted to fraud
and oppression.92 Her claim of oppression alleged that John (1) domi-
nated the management of the corporation; (2) refused to create an ex-
ecutive vice president position for her; (3) refused to establish a
reasonable stock valuation, as required by the restrictions on the
transfer of stock found in the bylaws; and (4) excluded her from any
voice in management aside from participation in the annual meet-
ing.93 Jeanne requested that the court dissolve the family farm corpo-
ration as a remedy for the alleged oppression. The Montana Supreme
Court upheld the district court's determination that Jeanne had suf-
88. McCreight v. McCreight, 473 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)(finding fiduciary re-
lationship and imposing constructive trust); Lamb v. Lamb, 464 N.E.2d 873 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984)(seeking to set aside conveyance of land in family farm because of
an alleged violation of fiduciary duty); Malunney v. Meade, 359 N.E.2d 1091 (IMI.
App. Ct. 1977)(creating constructive trust on family farm and entering decree of
partition); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984)(bringing action,
by owners, for breach of fiduciary duty); Struckhoffv. Echo Ridge Farm, Inc., 833
S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)(bringing action to dissolve family farm corpora-
tion); Mehl v. Mehl, 786 P.2d 1173 (Mont. 1990)(involving dispute over distribu-
tion of property in dissolution of family farm); Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230
(Mont. 1983)(bringing action to dissolve family farm corporation); Fox v. 7L Bar
Ranch, 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982)(bringing action to dissolve and liquidate family
farm); Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d 214 (Mont. 1981)(alleging fraud by
majority owners of family farm); Herboldsheimer v. Herboldsheimer, No. A-92-
1043, 1993 WL 311616 (Neb. App. Aug. 17, 1991)(partition dispute involving a
family farm); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1986)(bringing action to dissolve family farm corporation); Gimpel v. Bol-
stein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)(bringing action to dissolve family
farm corporation); Carnescca v. Carnescca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977)(creating
implied constructive trust in favor of brother who owned one third of the farm
acreage).
89. 629 P.2d 214 (Mont. 1981).
90. 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982).
91. 669 P.2d 230 (Mont. 1983).
92. Skierka v. Skierka, 629 P.2d 214, 218-21 (Mont. 1981).
93. Id. at 220-21.
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fered unlawful oppression. The court stated that "[o]ppression may be
more easily found in a close-held, family corporation than in a larger,
public corporation."9 4 The court then found that "'b]y its very nature,
intracorporate problems arising in a close corporation demand the un-
usual and extraordinary remedies available only in a court of eq-
uity."9 5 The court concluded that if the parties could not agree upon
property division and transfer, it would be appropriate for the trial
court to liquidate the business. 9 6
The Skierka case is one of the few cases where a court sustained a
trial court's order to liquidate a farm business. Most courts order rem-
edies other than liquidation.97 It is likely that the court permitted
liquidation in Skierka because of its unique facts. The court in
Skierka found that Jeanne was defrauded by John in the transaction
first creating the corporation.98 The court also found that the transac-
tions by which the corporation was formed could be rescinded because
of a mutual mistake arising from both parties' reliance on a belief that
unequal stock ownership made no "real difference" in who controlled
the corporation.9 9
One year later, the Montana Supreme Court considered a second
case involving dissension among owners of a family farm corporation.
In Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch,30 0 the minority shareholder, Melvin Fox,
complained that the majority shareholders managed the farm corpora-
tion in a way that deprived him of a financial return. Melvin alleged
that the majority owners excluded him from having a voice in the
business and failed to pay dividends or other remuneration to him.1 0 1
Melvin asked the court to dissolve the corporation in response to the
the majority shareholder's wrongful conduct. The Montana Supreme
Court sustained the district court's findings of oppression. The court
noted that because there is no ready market for shares in family-
owned farms, it is easier for majority shareholders to effectively
squeeze out minority shareholders.10 2 The court then defined oppres-
sion as a violation of the minority shareholder's reasonable expecta-
tions. According to the court, Melvin had a reasonable expectation of
sharing in the profits of the farm when he inherited his stock in the
farm.1 0 3 Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court permitted division of
94. Id. at 221.
95. Id. (quoting Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 409 P.2d 813, 820 (Mont.
1966)).
96. Id. at 222.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 100-146.
98. Skierka v. Sderka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d 214, 218-19 (Mont. 1981).
99. Id. at 219.
100. 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982).
101. Id. at 931.
102. Id. at 933.
103. Id. at 936.
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the farm, stating that "a division of the 7L Bar [farm] would neither
disrupt the business of a going concern nor do any injury to the
public."1o 4
In deciding to allow division of the farm, the court described the
factors it considers before using its equitable powers to intervene.
Those factors included: (1) whether the corporation can conduct busi-
ness profitably, (2) whether dissolution would be beneficial or detri-
mental to shareholders, and (3) whether it would be injurious to the
public. 05 In making these determinations, the court stated that
courts could consider the length of time the farm had been operating,
the market for the sale of an owner's interest, and whether a party
might buy the interest of another. 06 The court concluded that it
would allow a division of the family farm because to "disallow a divi-
sion would greatly harm Melvin Fox by making him the victim of cor-
porate formalities."' 0 7
The final case in the Montana trilogy is Maddox v. Norman.OS De-
cided one year after Fox, the Maddox case involved a minority share-
holder in a family farm corporation who alleged oppression by the
controlling shareholders. The plaintiff, Faye Maddox, alleged her
brother, Frank Norman, Jr., operated the farm in such a way as to
deprive her of a voice in management.10 9 Faye and her husband had
lived and worked on the ranch, but left the ranch because they could
not make an adequate living. After she left, Faye was not notified of
corporate meetings. Frank failed to keep separate books and records
for the corporation and used corporate property for personal pur-
poses.110 The proceeds of a corporate loan were used to repay a loan
on property filed in Frank's name.1 11 Likewise, the proceeds of the
sale of calves and crops and rental income of the corporation were de-
posited in Frank's account.' 12 Alleging misapplication and waste of
corporate funds, Faye requested appointment of a receiver to liquidate
the farm's property. The district court refused to liquidate the farm,
reasoning that the "prodigal in this instance must defer to the one who
stayed at home, built the ranch, worked with the father and struggled
to a successful ranch unit."113
The Montana Supreme Court sustained the district court's refusal
to liquidate and ordered Faye to sell her share to the farm corporation.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 935.
106. Id. at 935-36.
107. Id. at 936.
108. 669 P.2d 230 (Mont. 1983).
109. Id. at 232.
110. Id. at 232-33.
111. Id. at 233.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 234.
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In justifying its decision, the Montana Supreme Court noted that liq-
uidation of the farm would be an unduly extreme remedy. It also
seemed to agree with the district court's determination that Faye, in
fact, was a "prodigal."114 Thus, the court stated that the majority
shareholders would be unjustly harmed by liquidation of assets they
have worked "long and hard to improve.""i 5 The court also acknowl-
edged the practical difficulties in liquidating a ranch by accurately
finding that "[1l]iquidation of ranch property might take years and
might yield a much less satisfactory result than other available reme-
dies."116 The ranch, the court found, was a "successful family ranch
and, barring dissolution, is likely to remain so."117 Ordering Faye to
sell her stock to the corporation would "allow the ranch to continue
operating without unfair interruption" and allow the majority share-
holders "to enjoy the rightful fruits of their labors on the ranch while
still allowing a full accounting for corporate funds.""i8 For a third
time in three years, the court in Maddox used an equitable remedy to
resolve oppression.
The Montana trilogy demonstrates at least one court's willingness
to look at the special circumstances in cases involving dissension on
the family farm. Owners of family farm corporations have reasonable
expectations of sharing in both the management and income of the
family farm. The Montana cases properly provide that courts should
protect the owners' reasonable expectations while at the same time
protecting the integrity of the family farm as an economic unit.
B. Cases from Other Jurisdictions
Like the Montana Supreme Court, courts in other states carefully
scrutinize family farm disputes to protect the shareholder's reason-
able expectations. Relatively recent cases from New York, Iowa, New
Mexico, and Missouri demonstrate this careful scrutiny.
In the New York case of Gimpel v. Bolstein,'19 second and third
generation owners of a family farm were embroiled in a dispute over a
shareholder, Robert Gimpel, who allegedly stole money from the cor-
poration. After the alleged theft, the corporation fired Robert as an
employee. Other shareholders continued to receive substantial bene-
fits from the farm corporation, but because the corporation did not pay
114. The pejorative reference to Faye as a prodigal is somewhat troubling. Faye and
her husband left the ranch because it was not economically able to support her.
Unlike the prodigal son, Faye did not squander her inheritence nor did she re-
ceive more than that to which she was legally entitled. See Luke 15:11-32.
115. Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 236 (Mont. 1983).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 238.
118. Id.
119. 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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dividends Robert received nothing.120 Likewise, Robert was excluded
from managerial decisions and received very little information about
the farm's affairs. Robert petitioned for dissolution alleging the ma-
jority shareholders' oppressive actions unlawfully froze him out. The
New York Supreme Court found that any violations of Robert's rea-
sonable expectations were his own fault. Because Robert violated the
majority shareholders' reasonable expectations of "fidelity and hon-
esty," the only expectations he could have of the majority shareholders
was "ostracism and prosecution."'21 Nevertheless the court held that
the majority owners must treat Robert with "probity and fair dealing"
and that their conduct must not be "burdensome, harsh and
wrongful."12 2
The court faulted the majority owners' conduct of depriving Robert
of all return. Like the Montana Supreme Court, the New York
Supreme Court referred to a biblical dispute between brothers noting
that "[e]ven Cain was granted protection from the perpetual vengeful-
ness of his fellow man."'12 3 Though refusing to liquidate the business
because it was not reasonably necessary for the protection of the
shareholders' interest,124 the court did fashion a remedy to protect
Robert. The court required the majority shareholder to make an elec-
tion. The majority shareholder could elect to pay substantial divi-
dends and adjust shareholder salaries downward, or the majority
shareholder could make a substantial and reasonable offer to buy Rob-
ert's shares.125 By ordering these alternative remedies, the court pre-
served the integrity of the family farm while protecting the excluded
shareholder's interest.
The New Mexico case of McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son,
Inc.,126 provides another example of a court refusing to liquidate a
farm in the face of oppression. In McCauley, LaVerne and Fred Mc-
Cauley, husband and wife, owned sixty percent of the stock in Tom
McCauley & Son, Inc., an incorporated family ranch. Afer they di-
vorced, LaVerne was not reelected as an officer and director of the
ranch corporation. In addition, the majority shareholders decided to
pay corporate debts before paying dividends to shareholders. LaVerne
alleged she was deprived of a voice in management and of the benefits
she previously received from the corporation, including: (1) adequate
food and lodging for herself and her children; (2) transportation, gas,
oil, and other related expenses; (3) clothing; (4) personal maintenance
120. Id. at 1017.
121. Id. at 1019-20.
122. Id. at 1020.
123. Id. at 1021 (citing Genesis 4:12-15).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1022.
126. 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
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expenses; and (5) increases in her ownership interest in the corpora-
tion.127 LaVerne sued the corporation for money damages and peti-
tioned the court to order liquidation. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals agreed that LaVerne's reasonable expectations to participate
in management and share in the farm profits were violated.128 It
found that the animosity between LaVerne and Fred was "not capable
of resolution and thereby present[ed] an irreconcilable barrier to the
ability of the corporation to function properly."' 2 9 Like the Montana
Supreme Court in Fox, the New Mexico court noted that in closely
held family corporations, owners are more susceptible to oppression
because there is no ready market for their stock.130 As a result, mi-
nority shareholders in family corporations are more likely to be held
hostage by a controlling owner. To protect against this danger, the
court determined, courts should intervene if "the acts complained of
serve to frustrate the legitimate expectations of minority sharehold-
ers."'13 1 In family corporations, according to the court, "courts have
normally given considerable weight to the hostility existing between
family members and its effect upon the minority shareholder's ability
to have an effective voice in the running of the corporation."'13 2
After finding oppression, the district court had ordered the corpo-
ration to select among one of these three options as a means of resolv-
ing the dispute: (1) liquidation of the corporation, (2) partitioning and
reorganization of the farm, or (3) purchase of LaVerne's interest. 3 3
With respect to the third choice, the district court had permitted the
corporation to discount the value of LaVerne's interest by twenty-five
percent because it was a minority interest.13 4 On appeal, LaVerne
contended that liquidation was the proper remedy. She also argued
that the lower court should not have permitted the corporation to
purchase her interest at a discount, stating that ordering the purchase
at a discount allowed Fred to benefit from his wrongdoing. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals correctly held that the district court was not
bound to order dissolution and liquidation; instead the court could
fashion remedies using its "reservoir of equitable powers."'135 Since
dissolution of the farm corporation is a harsh remedy, the court of ap-
peals decided that the lower court had properly structured alternative
remedies for preserving the farm as an economic unit while providing
a return to the minority shareholder.
127. Id. at 238-39.
128. Id. at 240.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 236.
132. Id. at 238.
133. Id. at 233.
134. Id. at 244.
135. Id. at 243.
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Sauer v. Moffitt,136 an Iowa case, provides further evidence of
courts' unwillingness to liquidate a family farm corporation. In Sauer,
two inactive minority shareholders in the family farm corporation,
Martha & Kathy, sued because they did not receive notices of meet-
ings or distributions of earnings. The majority shareholders justified
their refusal to send the notices and distributions by alleging that
they had a "corporate philosophy" to use earnings to improve the farm
and to avoid incurring corporate debt. Accordingly, the majority
shareholders argued, the corporation did not have sufficient funds to
pay dividends.137 The trial court held that the majority owners
breached their fiduciary duty and ordered the majority to buy out the
plaintiffs' shares. On appeal, Martha and Kathy argued that the court
should have ordered a full liquidation of the farm business. The ap-
pellate court, like the courts in Maddox, Gimpel, and McCauley, prop-
erly noted that courts are not required to liquidate family farm
corporations. Instead, the court held that an order requiring redemp-
tion of the plaintiffs' shares was sufficient to protect Martha and
Kathy.'38 Though the court ordered the majority to buy out the com-
plaining shareholders, the court noted that it had broad equitable
powers to resolve dissension. The court stated it had the power to ap-
point a receiver to supervise the business operation, order an account-
ing, issue an injunction to prohibit oppressive conduct, or order a
damage award.13 9 The court did not indicate, however, how to select
among those remedies.
In the final leading case, Struckhoff v. Echo Ridge Farms, Inc.,14 0
Cletus Struckhoff, a shareholder in a family farm corporation, quit his
employment with the farm and moved to another state. After Cletus
quit, his brother, who remained on the farm, substantially increased
his own salary. Although the farm had significant profits, the corpo-
ration retained all profits to acquire new assets and to reduce debt.
No dividends were paid.141 The corporation had not, for a seven year
period, held annual shareholders' meetings as the bylaws required.14 2
Cletus sued for oppression and convinced the trial court to dissolve the
farm corporation. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's determination that Cletus was entitled to dissolution as a mat-
ter of law. Discussing remedies, the court of appeals noted that
"[d]issolution of a corporation is a drastic remedy and courts should
resort to [dissolution] only to prevent irreparable injury, imminent
136. 363 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).
137. Id. at 271.
138. Id. at 275.
139. Id. at 274-75.
140. 833 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
141. Id. at 464-65.
142. Id. at 465.
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danger of loss, or miscarriage of justice,"'143 and that before ordering
dissolution, the trial court should have considered "the effect the dis-
solution would have on the public as well as the shareholders."' 44 Be-
cause the defendants submitted affidavits demonstrating that
continued existence of the family farm "would benefit the public
through its high production and profitability," the court of appeals
ruled it was improper for the trial court to summarily order dissolu-
tion of the farm corporation.14 5 The court failed to fully describe why,
in a private dispute between owners of a family farm, the public inter-
est in continuing operation of the farm outweighed the right of the
majority shareholder.14 6 Nevertheless, the case does demonstrate the
extreme hesitancy of courts to require dissolution and liquidation of
the family farm.
Case law provides ample evidence of courts' willingness to inter-
vene in disputes among owners of the family farm. Most of these
courts, however, refuse to liquidate a family farm, preferring the ap-
plication of less harsh remedies. Nevertheless, these courts have yet
to articulate clear and consistent principles for selecting among equi-
table remedies.
C. Legislative Approaches
North Dakota is the only state to address by statute the protection
of minority shareholders in farm corporations. The North Dakota
Century Code protects shareholders who wish to withdraw from a
statutory farming and ranching corporation.' 47 If neither the remain-
ing shareholders, the corporation, nor a qualified third party wishes to
purchase withdrawing owners' shares, the withdrawing shareholders
may bring an action to dissolve the farm corporation.148 The remain-
ing shareholders of the corporation have one year to purchase the
withdrawing shareholders' interests. 49 If they fail to do so, the court
must dissolve the corporation. The assets of the dissolved corporation
will be used to pay the creditors, with any remaining assets distrib-
uted to shareholders. Shareholders in North Dakota farm corpora-
tions have these rights even if the majority shareholders have not
acted wrongfully. The North Dakota statutory solution effectively cre-
ates a minority shareholder right to compel a buyout or, if the corpora-
143. Id. at 466.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. At least one commentator argues that courts should satisfy the public interest
before selecting a remedy. See Sandra K. Miller, Should the Definition of Oppres-
sive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude a Consideration of Ethical Con-
duct and Business Purpose? 97 DicL L. REv. 227, 262-66 (1993).





tion refuses, a dissolution.' 50 The net result is that North Dakota
farm and ranch corporations are treated, for purposes of dissolution,
much like partnerships. Partnership law allows a partner to dissoci-
ate with a partnership at any time, forcing a buyout of the partner's
interest if the other partners wish to avoid dissolution.' 5 ' The North
Dakota Century Code contains similar dissolution-at-will provisions
for farms operating as limited liability companies.' 5 2
The dissolution-at-will provisions of the North Dakota corporate
farming statute, however, do not properly address the problem of dis-
sension among farm corporation shareholders. The shareholder's
statutory right to require majority shareholders, even if they are fair
and competent, to dissolve the farm makes long-range planning diffi-
cult at best. Giving shareholders the power to force dissolution allows
an obstreperous, disgruntled shareholder to exact undue concessions
from the majority shareholders. Dissolution-at-will rights of minority
shareholders do more than level the playing field; they tilt the playing
field unduly toward the minority shareholder. If majority sharehold-
ers do not accede to the minority shareholder's demands, the farm cor-
poration will be liquidated, perhaps under fire-sale conditions. For
the family farm, often held by families for generations, this liquidation
results in both financial loss and the loss of a way of life. Although the
North Dakota statute permits the shareholders to avoid liquidation by
buying the minority shareholder's interest, that may be meaningless
since most farm owners lack access to substantial liquid assets and
the majority owners may not be able to accomplish the purchase.
Therefore the farm may be lost.
V. PROPOSED JUDICIAL STANDARD FOR RESOLVING
DISSENSION AMONG THE OWNERS OF THE
FAMILY FARM
Although substantially all cases involving dissension among family
farm owners do not order liquidation of the farm, the courts' reasoning
for disallowing liquidation is inconsistent. The Montana Supreme
Court, for example, will not reward the "prodigal" who moves away
from the farm,153 while the Missouri Court of Appeals emphasizes the
150. Professors Hetherington and Dooley have advocated applying this approach to all
corporations. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Explora-
tion: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem,
63 VA. L. REv. 1, 34-59 (1977). They argue that litigation between owners of
closely held corporations is an expensive way to establish a purchase price for the
interest of minority shareholders. Id. at 34-35. Because the outcome of most
shareholder dissension suits is a buyout, the current system, they observe, in-
volves unnecessary transaction costs. Id. at 35.
151. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801(1) (1992).
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06.1-27 (1993).
153. Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 234 (Mont. 1983).
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need to protect the public interest.' 5 4 Other courts, like the New Mex-
ico Court of Appeals and the Iowa Court of Appeals, defer to the lower
court without articulating why they preferred a buyout instead of dis-
solution. The absence of consistent, articulated standards for resolv-
ing disputes between family farm shareholders makes it difficult to
predict how courts will resolve dissension.
A. Dissension in Farm Corporations
1. Threshold Standards for Judicial Intervention
Because of the nature of family relationships in farm country, fam-
ily farm owners rarely negotiate all contingencies that might end in
disagreement.-55 Likewise, because of the family relationship and hi-
erarchy, family members do not bargain to create systems for resolv-
ing future disputes. Consequently, there are substantial gaps in the
family farm contract. Since family farmers do not provide for all con-
tingencies, commentators have properly recognized that courts should
apply fiduciary duties to fill gaps in these contracts.' 5 6 Because fam-
ily-owned businesses, particularly family farms, are unique, courts
must often intervene to protect minority shareholders.
Decisions such as Fox and McCauley properly recognize that all
shareholders in family farm corporations expect to participate in man-
agement and share profits. Because of the problem of illiquidity of the
family-owned farm, shareholders cannot leave a corporation when
their reasonable expectations are violated. Consequently, sharehold-
ers are often unable to enjoy any return from the corporation unless
courts intervene to protect their reasonable expectations.
Protection of parties' reasonable expectations is a fundamental
legal doctrine. According to Professor Clifford, this doctrine is "near
the center of the legal universe."' 5 7 Similarly, courts have long pro-
tected the expectations of parties to contracts.' 5 8 Finally, property
law defines and protects the expectations of property owners.' 5 9
Therefore, because shareholders hold a property interest in the corpo-
ration and have a contract-type relationship with other shareholders,
courts should protect the shareholder's reasonable expectations. To
fully protect reasonable expectations, courts must have available a
broad array of equitable remedies. As noted above, remedies include
154. Struckhoffv. Echo Ridge Farms, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
156. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF COR-
Po'RATE LAW 92-93 (1991).
157. Clifford, supra note 60, at 42.
158. 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORmIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 (1963).




ordering: (1) dissolution and liquidation of the corporation;' 60 (2) divi-
sion of the corporation's property;'6i (3) payment of dividends;i62 (4)
appointment of fiscal agents, receivers, or provisional directors;163 (5)
removal of directors;164 (6) forfeiture of controlling shareholders sala-
ries;165 (7) set-aside of corporate actions;i 66 or (8) an accounting.167
To enhance consistency and provide predictability, courts need gui-
dance concerning which of the remedies to apply in each case. The
following standards provide guidance to courts when selecting an ap-
propriate remedy. First, the remedy should maximize the ability of
minority shareholders to realize their reasonable expectations. Sec-
ond, the remedy should minimize the administrative costs associated
with resolving the dissension. Third, the remedy should maximize the
value of the economic unit while allowing owners to realize value in
accordance with their reasonable expectations.' 68 These standards
are particularly appropriate for resolving disputes among owners of
family farm businesses. Courts should balance protecting the minor-
ity shareholder's reasonable expectations with maximizing the farm's
value as an economic unit. If possible, a court should provide for the
minority shareholders, while at the same time preserving the farm as
a going concern. If courts adopt the above standards, they will rarely
liquidate a farm corporation, but will seek solutions that preserve the
farm as a viable economic unit.
When courts select a remedy to protect the shareholder's reason-
able expectations, minority owners will realize the value of their bar-
gained-for participation. As a result, if a court finds that a farm
shareholder reasonably expects to share earnings, the court could fol-
low the approach of the court in Gimpel by ordering the business to
alter its financial structure and- pay dividends i 69 If a majority im-
properly applies corporate assets, courts could appoint a special fiscal
agent or neutral third party to monitor and approve payments.i7 0 By
ordering narrow and precise remedies such as these, courts protect
the reasonable expectation of parties without ordering partial or com-
plete liquidation of the family farm.
160. See Bahls, supra note 48, at 295-305.
161. See Bahls, supra note 48, at 305-06.
162. See Bahls, supra note 48, at 307-08.
163. See Bahls, supra note 48, at 308-11.
164. See Bahls, supra note 48, at 311.
165. See Bahls, supra note 48.
166. See Bahls, supra note 48.
167. See Bahls, supra note 48.
168. See Bahls, supra note 48, at 320.
169. See Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). See also
Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So. 2d 58 (Miss. 1982)(utilizing a similar approach in a non-
farm case, the court equalized deferred payments from a medical partnership).
170. See Roach v. Margulies, 126 A.2d 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1956)(ordering a fiscal agent
to monitor and approve payments).
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Of course, before a court can protect reasonable expectations, it
must determine reasonable expectations. At times, ascertaining the
reasonable expectations of family farm owners is difficult. As dis-
cussed in Gimpel, farm corporations are often generations removed
from their founders. 171 Therefore, the reasonable expectations of
long-deceased founders are difficult to ascertain. Even if expectations
can be ascertained, the expectancy and understandings of the share-
holders may have changed over time.172 Yet, not all changes in expec-
tations are reasonable. Consequently, courts should protect changed
expectations only if the other owners agree to the changes.
Although reasonable expectations are difficult to ascertain in many
businesses, the cases involving disputes between family farm owners
generally identify three primary expectations: (1) the expectation that
each owner will have some say in management;173 (2) the expectation
that controlling shareholders will not operate the corporation solely
for their own benefit;174 and (3) the expectation that all shareholders
will participate in profits from the farm.175
Some of the expectations of family farm shareholders are easier for
courts to protect than others. If shareholders are not receiving profits
from the farm, a court could easily order dividend payments. Courts
have a more difficult time, however, protecting the minority share-
holder's expectation that the majority owners will not operate the
farm solely for their own benefit. If the majority owner chooses to so
operate the farm, he or she is often acting in bad faith. To force a
shareholder repeatedly acting in bad faith to suddenly change his or
her conduct is a difficult task. Such a task would require a court to
issue multiple and frequent orders. Courts properly refuse to become
171. Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
172. See Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 649, 655 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985)("These reasonable expectations are to be determined by examining the en-
tire history of the participants' relationship. That history includes the reason-
able expectations created at the inception of the relationship, and those which
evolved during the course of the parties' relationship.").
173. See, e.g., Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 936 (Mont. 1982); Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d 214, 221 (Mont. 1981); McCauley v. Tom McCauley
& Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232,238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). Harl also notes: "Finally, off-
farm heirs often voice concerns about participation in management. Manage-
ment, however, is frequently defined as financial management with emphasis on
decisions relating to how income from the farm operation is to be distributed."
HARL, supra note 52, § 41.03[1], at 41-28.
174. See, e.g., Sauer v. Moffit, 363 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d 214, 219 (Mont. 1981); McCauley v. Tom McCauley
& Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 239-40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
175. See, e.g., Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 936 (Mont. 1982); McCauley v.
Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232,239-40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Gimpel v.
Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). Harl adds that off-farm
heirs are usually concerned about receiving a financial return on their farm in-
heritance. HARL, supra note 52, § 41.03[1l, at 41-28.
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embroiled in prolonged supervision of disputes between business own-
ers. 176 Moreover, when freeze-outs occur courts may not be equipped
to force majority shareholders to allow the minority to participate in
management. Often a deep schism has developed between the major-
ity and minority shareholders after the founders died or retired. If the
founder once effectively resolved disputes because of his or her stand-
ing as the patriarch of the farm, a court generally cannot replace the
founder and force the parties to work together. Even if a court were to
issue an order in such a situation, the schisms may be so deep that the
shareholders will comply with neither the letter nor the spirit of the
order. Further, if disputes between minority and majority sharehold-
ers are numerous and long-standing, the administrative costs, such as
attorney fees, appraisals, and expert fees, associated with protecting
the parties' reasonable expectations may be prohibitive. Not only do
frequent trips to the courthouse impose heavy burdens on the judicial
system and zap managerial energy and effectiveness, but the costs of
monitoring and enforcing court orders can be substantial.
As a result of the administrative costs of obtaining orders to pro-
tect reasonable expectations, courts are often forced to fashion an or-
der which does not fulfill reasonable expectations. These courts
should instead seek to maximize the value of the farm as an economic
unit, while at the same time allowing shareholders to realize value in
accordance with their ownership interest. In family-owned farm
cases, the solution that maximizes the value of the business will usu-
ally be a forced buyout of the minority shareholder.
Consider the hypothetical case of the Smith Family Farms, Inc.
Assume that the three offspring of the founders, Kate, Kurt, and Ke-
vin, own the stock in equal amounts, and that the parents who
founded the farm intended to preserve the farm as an economic unit
for their children.177 Assume further that the parents also desire to
treat each child equitably when they die.178
176. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 559-60 (N.C. 1983)(holding
that an order making the antagonistic owners resolve their differences is incon-
sistent with a court of equity's reluctance to enforce unwanted personal
relationships).
177. Kelly and Ludtke observe:
Members of the farm family often have a deep emotional commitment to
the type of life represented by the family farm. The parents may
strongly feel this life contributes to emotional stability, personal integ-
rity, and domestic tranquility.... [A] predominant objective of the typi-
cal farm family may be preservation of the entire farm operating unit as
an inheritance for the children.
KELLY & LuD=z, supra note 53, §§ 1.12-1.13, at 1-11.
178. Kelly and Ludtke also observe: "Generally parents want all children to share




Suppose that Kate moves off the farm. As an off-farm heir she
probably has different objectives than the on-farm heirs.17 9 Kate may
want her share of farm profits, which she now considers an illiquid
investment. She may desire to liquidate her interest and reinvest in
an investment she can control. Her brothers, Kurt and Kevin, may
desire to draw salaries but retain other earnings in the corporation to
reduce debt, provide a financial cushion, or expand operations. Think-
ing Kate is too removed from the business to comment meaningfully
on management, they may exclude her. If she complains, they may
regard her as ungrateful and take steps to freeze her out.
Assume a court decides that Kevin and Kurt violated Kate's rea-
sonable expectations by excluding her from management and failing
to distribute earnings. The court will likely find that forcing Kevin
and Kurt to accept Kate as a co-manager is too difficult. While a court
could issue frequent orders to distribute earnings and allow co-man-
agement of the family farm, the cost would be exorbitant. Instead, the
court is forced to order a remedy that does not continue the co-man-
agement rights and expectations of Kate, Kevin, and Kurt. Available
remedies include dissolution and liquidation of a corporation, division
of the business, and requiring one party to buy the interests of
another.
Dissolving Smith Farms causes economic waste.iSO Though the
difference between the value of farm real estate as a going concern
(with competent management) and the liquidation value of the farm
may be less significant than other businesses, it is nonetheless signifi-
cant.' 8 If a farm is liquidated, all owners forfeit any going-concern
premium. Further, if a farm is unnecessarily liquidated, the public
policy favoring family farms is violated. Both FoxlS2 and
Struckhoff'83 expressly acknowledge the public interest in preserving
family farms.
179. Harl correctly observes:
Off-farm heirs may hold quite different goals and objectives from the on-
farm heirs. So long as the parents maintain control over the operation,
the divergent objectives of on-farm and off-farm heirs may be of little
concern. With the parents removed from the scene, or reduced to minor-
ity owner status, the differences in objectives may become obvious.
HARL, supra note 52, § 41.03[1], at 41-28.
180. See SHANNON PRATr, VALUING A BuslNEss: THE ANALYSIs AND APPRAISAL OF
CLOSELY HELD ComrAmEs 29 (2d ed. 1989); Robert W. HilIman, The Dissatisfied
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Per-
manence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. Rv. 1, 47 n.147
(1982).
181. The importance of competent farm management is discussed in MURRAY R. WIsE,
INVESTING IN FARmAND 173-75 (1989).
182. Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, 645 P.2d 929, 935 (Mont. 1982).
183. Struckhoff v. Echo Ridge Farms, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
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A more significant reason not to liquidate the farm is that liquida-
tion frustrates the parties' reasonable expectations. Liquidation frus-
trates all owners' expectations to participate in management and
earnings. Also, liquidation frustrates expectations that the family
farm will remain in the family. The parent-founders of the Smith
Farm Corporation, however, probably intended that if their children
could not work together, the on-farm heir would retain control of the
farm.' 8 4 Parents, concerned about equity, would also expect off-farm
heirs to be compensated for their interest.
Dividing the Smith farm property is probably not feasible. Kate
may lack farm management expertise. Even if Kate has the skills to
serve as a competent farm manager, the farm might not be divisible
into two viable economic units. Though farm real estate is usually
easily divisible, today's economies of scale often mean smaller farm
units are not profitable. Even if the farm is divisible into two viable
economic units, a court might properly hesitate to divide it. The court
may have difficulty determining the proper division line for the real
estate. Also, courts are likely to have difficulty deciding how to value
and divide personal property such as tractors. Additionally, it is diffi-
cult to decide which shareholders receive the buildings and improve-
ments, which shareholders are responsible for which long term
liabilities and leases, and who is to benefit from existing business
arrangements.18 5
In the hypothetical Smith Farms case, as with most family farms,
the most appropriate remedy may be a forced buyout. This solution
best maximizes the value of the business by preserving the farm as an
economic unit while protecting the minority shareholder's expectation
to receive some compensation from his or her interest in the farm.' 8 6
A forced buyout may, nonetheless, create significant problems for
Smith Farms. If Smith Farms is like most farms, it has a relatively
low ratio of liquid to fixed assets.' 8 7 Farm businesses, again, are gen-
erally land rich but cash poor. As a result, the Smith Farms may not
be able to generate the cash quickly enough to pay Kate immediately
for the fair market value of her interest. The best solution to this
184. Kelly & Ludtke aptly observe that "although parents may wish to shift manage-
ment control to a child interested in farming, they typically desire to be fair to all
their children." KELLY & LuDTrc, supra note 53 § 12.02, at 12-3 & 12-4. They
conclude that parents generally "wish to give the absentee children an interest in
the farm, while limiting the powers associated with such an interest in order to
avoid interference with the operator." KELLY & LuDTKE, supra note 53 § 12.02, at
12-4.
185. See, e.g., Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1324-25 (D.S.C. 1987)(refusing to
order a division of assets because of these problems).
186. Of course, a forced buyout does not protect the minority shareholder's expectation
of participating in management.
187. HARL, supra note 52, § 41.01[2], at 41-9.
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problem is for a court to order installment payments. State statutes
in several jurisdictions give courts the power to order installment pay-
ments.' 8 8 In jurisdictions without these statutes, courts utilizing
their broad equitable powers to resolve disputes between shareholders
may presumably order installment payments.' 8 9 If courts order in-
stallment payments, they could also require security or collateral to
secure the obligation with collateral.
B. Dissension in Farm Partnerships and Farm Limited
Liability Companies
Both partnership law and law governing limited liability compa-
nies recognize a court's power to intervene when one owner oppresses
another. Section 801 of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act allows
courts to dissolve a partnership when "another partner has engaged in
conduct relating to the partnership business which makes it not rea-
sonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with that
partner."' 9 0 Frequently when a court dissolves a partnership, it is re-
sponding to a situation where one partner violates the reasonable ex-
pectations of the other.19'
Courts also have the power to dissolve limited liability companies.
The American Bar Association Prototype Limited Liability Company
Act, for example, provides that a court may decree "dissolution of a
limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business...."192 The official comments to the "not reason-
ably practicable" language include "at least some of the causes of dis-
solution provided for in partnership law, particularly including
partner misconduct."'193
188. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 805, para. 12.55(f) (1993); M. CODE ANN. CoRPs. &
ASS'NS § 4-603 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West Supp. 1994). But see
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000(a) (West 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 12-7(8)(e) (West
Supp. 1993)(both requiring cash payment).
189. But see Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Processing, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 362,
368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), affd sub nom. In re Taines, 486 N.Y.S.2d 699 (N.Y.
1985).
190. UNuw. PARTNERSHp AcT § 801 (1992).
191. Ferrick v. Barry, 68 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (Mass. 1946)("Even if the court may
think that one partner could carry on successfully, if he were allowed to push
aside the others, it ought not to sanction such an alteration in the agreed rela-
tions of the partners."). See also Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d
1057 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Wood v. Holiday Mobile
Home Resorts, Inc., 625 P.2d 337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826
(1981); Owen v. Cohen, 199 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1941); Lau v. Wong, 616 P.2d 1031
(Haw. Ct. App. 1980); Tembrina v. Simos, 567 N.E.2d 536 (IlM. App. Ct. 1991);
Susman v. Venture, 449 N.E.2d 143 (IMI. App. Ct. 1982); Ohlendorf v. Feinstein,
636 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Boland v. Daly, 318 A.2d 329 (Pa. 1974).
192. ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. AT § 902 (1992).
193. Id. cmt. at 64.
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One might ask why courts might intervene in cases of oppression
in farm partnerships and farm limited liability companies. Both part-
ners and members of limited liability companies may dissociate and,
in most cases, force a buyout or liquidation without court action.
Courts, however, might still intervene in limited liability companies
and partnerships with a specific term of existence. In partnerships
and limited liability companies with a specific term of existence, those
partners or members dissociating before the end of the term will suffer
a reduction in the amount of damages caused by their premature dis-
sociation.19 4 Likewise, partners cannot force payment for their inter-
est until the term of the business expires.195 As a result, both
partners and members of limited liability companies face the risk of
incurring a penalty for premature dissociation when they dissociate
because of an action of an oppressive majority member's actions. In
order to protect owners of partnerships and limited liability compa-
nies from suffering this penalty, courts should exercise their equitable
powers to fashion a remedy to protect the minority owner from suffer-
ing a premature dissolution penalty. In the family farm context,
courts should not order a dissolution unless majority owners are un-
willing to purchase the minority owners' shares. When courts find op-
pression, they should order a purchase at fair value without any
reduction for damages caused by premature dissolution.
Courts, then, clearly have the statutory power to order a dissolu-
tion of both partnerships196 and limited liability companies. 197
Professors Bromberg and Ribstein are therefore correct in observing
that the approach courts take to the misconduct of partners is similar
to the approach courts take in shareholder oppression cases.198 Nev-
ertheless, in the context of family farms, courts exercising their juris-
diction to dissolve partnerships and limited liability companies should
remember that dissolution may cause liquidation of the farm, which
not only destroys the going-concern value of the farm, but also defeats
the family's reasonable expectation that the family farm will remain
in the family. To avoid economic waste and to protect these expecta-
tions, courts tempted to dissolve family farm partnerships and limited
liability companies should consider the approach taken by the courts
in Gimpel v. Bolstein'9 9 and McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son,
194. See ABA PROTOTYPE LTD. LuB. Co. AcT § 802(C) (1992); UNIF. PARTNERSHMP ACT
§ 603(b) (1992).
195. See UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 701(h) (1992).
196. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 801 (1992).
197. ABA PROTOTYPE Lm. LLrA. Co. AcT § 902 (1992).
198. 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RmSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 7.06(c), at 7:63 (1994).
See also Robert W. Hillman, Misconduct as a Basis for Excluding or Expelling a
Partner: Effecting Commercial Divorce and Securing Custody of the Business, 78
Nw. U. L. REv. 527, 547-51 (1983).
199. 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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Inc.20 0 In those cases, the courts allowed majority owners the oppor-
tunity to avoid a court-ordered dissolution by purchasing the com-
plaining minority shareholder's interest. Allowing parties to continue
operating the farm while purchasing the interest of the minority
owner preserves the family farm as a viable economic unit while pro-
tecting the minority owners' expectations of receiving some value from
their minority interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the fundamental problems family farms confront is how to
provide for a smooth succession of the farm business as it passes from
one generation to the next. Because family farm businesses are built
on parents' assumptions, often mistaken, that family members will
treat each other with trust and respect, the legal documents governing
the family farm are often woefully inadequate to provide for appropri-
ate dispute resolution between owners. If parents had clearly set out
the rights, duties, and obligations of both on- and off-farm heirs, the
need for judicial intervention would substantially decrease. Unfortu-
nately, thoughtful planning providing for smooth succession is not
common enough in rural America.
As a result of inadequate succession planning, courts frequently
are asked to intervene in disputes between owners of the family farm.
When resolving disputes, courts should strive to develop remedies
that both preserve the farm as an economic unit and protect the rea-
sonable expectations of the minority shareholders to receive appropri-
ate financial benefits from the family farm. The standards for
selection of remedies described in this article accomplish those objec-
tives. If courts clearly adopt these standards, both attorneys and agri-
cultural producers will gain greater certainty about judicial
approaches to disputes among owners of the family farm. Greater cer-
tainty encourages family members to resolve their disputes with a
handshake at home, instead of a lawsuit at the county courthouse.
200. 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
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